We present a notion of ergodicity for deterministic zero-sum differential games that extends the one in classical ergodic control theory to systems with two conflicting controllers. We describe its connections with the existence of a constant and uniform long-time limit of the value function of finite horizon games, and characterize this property in terms of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations. We also give several sufficient conditions for ergodicity and describe some extensions of the theory to stochastic differential games.
Introduction
We consider a nonlinear system in R m controlled by two playerṡ y(t) = f (y(t), a(t), b(t)),
and we denote with y x (·) the trajectory starting at x. We are also given a bounded, uniformly continuous running cost l, and we are interested in the payoffs associated to the long time average cost (briefly, LTAC), namely, 
l(y x (t), a(t), b(t)) dt.
We denote with u − val J ∞ (x) (respectively, l − val J ∞ (x)) the upper value of the zero-sum game with payoff J ∞ (respectively, the lower value of the game with payoff J ∞ ) which the 1st player a(·) wants to minimize while the 2nd player b(·) wants to maximize, and the values are in the sense of Variya-Roxin-Elliott-Kalton. We say that the LTAC game is ergodic if
for some constant λ. The terminology is motivated by the analogy with classical ergodic control theory, see, e.g., [11, 26, 14, 10, 22, 7, 8] , and by the fact that for uncontrolled system and cost the game is ergodic for all continuous l if the dynamical systemẏ = f (y) is ergodic with a unique invariant measure (see Proposition 13 of [3] for a precise statement). Similar problems were already studied for some games, in particular by Fleming and McEneaney [19] in the context of risk-sensitive control, Carlson and Haurie [13] within the turnpike theory, and Kushner [27] for controlled nondegenerate diffusion processes. There is a large literature on related problems for dicrete-time games, see the recent survey by Sorin [33] .
In order to have a compact state space we assume that the data f and l are Z m -periodic. First of all we show the connection between the ergodicity of the LTAC game and the existence of a constant and uniform long-time limit of the lower and upper value functions of the finite horizon games with the same running cost. We call this property ergodicity of the lower (respectively, upper) game. Then we prove that the lower game is ergodic with limit λ if and only if the lower value of the discounted infinite horizon game with payoff
l(y x (t), a(t), b(t)) e
−δt dt converges uniformly to λ as the discount rate δ tends to 0. Moreover, this is also equivalent to the existence of a Z m -periodic viscosity χ to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation Next we describe two sets of conditions ensuring the previous facts and therefore the ergodicity. The first is a bounded-time controllability property of the system by one of the players, uniformly with respect to the behavior of the opponent. It is a generalization to games of a condition used for systems with a single controller by Grüne [22] , Arisawa [7] , and Artstein and Gaitsgory [9] .
Different from the first, the second set of conditions is symmetric for the two players. We assume that some state variables y A are asymptotically controllable by the first player, and the remaining variables y B are asymptotically controllable by the second (see Section 2 for the precise definition). In this case neither player can control the whole state vector y = (y A , y B ). We further assume the running cost depends only on y A and y B and has a saddle point, namely,
Then we show that the LTAC game has the value λ = l.
In the last section we also show that for systems affected by a non-degenerate white noise the game is ergodic with no controllability assumptions on either player (see [27] for related results).
Our methods rely heavily on the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations associated to the games, in the framework of the theory of viscosity solutions. We follow ideas of authors such as P.-L. Lions and L.C. Evans, see [28, 16, 10, 8] , and their developments in our papers [3, 4] .
Undiscounted infinite horizon control problems arise in many applications to economics and engineering, see [14, 11, 26] and [13, 19, 33] for games. Our additional motivation is that ergodicity plays a crucial role in the theory of singular perturbation problems for the dimension reduction of multiple-scale systems [25, 11, 26, 24, 21, 34, 35, 30] and for the homogenization in oscillating media [28, 16, 17, 1, 23, 29, 12, 6] . A general principle emerging in the papers [9, 2, 3, 4] is that an appropriate form of ergodicity of the fast variables (for frozen slow variables) ensures the convergence of the singular perturbation problem, in a suitable sense.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the connection between the ergodicity of the LTAC game and the ergodicity of the lower and upper game. Section 2 studies the ergodicity of the finite horizon games. Section 3 presents some examples. In Section 4 we give some extensions of the results of Section 2 to diffusion processes controlled by two players, and we prove the ergodicity result for nondegenerate noise.
The full proofs of the results of this paper can be found in [5] .
The long-time-average-cost game and ergodicity
About the system (1) and the cost we assume throughout the paper that f : R m ×A×B → R m and l : R m × A × B → R are continuous and bounded, A and B are compact metric spaces, f is lipschitzean in x uniformly in a, b. In this section we do not assume the compactness of the state space.
We consider the cost funtional
where y x (·) is the trajectory corresponding to a(·) and b(·). We denote with A and B, respectively, the sets of open-loop (measurable) controls for the first and the second player, and with Γ and
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Some ergodic problems for differential games Martino Bardi ∆, respectively, the sets of nonanticipating strategies for the first and the second player, see, e.g., [18, 10] for the precise definition. Finally, we define the upper and lower values for the finite horizon game with average cost
and for the LTAC game
We say that the the lower game is (uniformly) ergodic if the long time limit of the finite horizon value exists, uniformly in x, and it is constant, i.e.,
Similarly, the upper game is ergodic if
Theorem 1 If the lower game is ergodic, then
if the upper game is ergodic, then
We recall the classical Isaacs' condition, or solvability of the small game,
(1.
3) It is well known that it implies the equality of the upper and the lower value of the finite horizon game, that is, the existence of the value of that game, which we denote with val J(T, x), see [18, 10] . Therefore we immediately get the following consequence of Theorem 1. 
Corollary
l − val J ∞ (x) = u − val J ∞ (x) = lim T →∞ val J(T, x) = λ, ∀x ∈ R m .
Characterizations of ergodicity
From now on we add periodicity to the standing assumptions:
This means that the state space is the m-torus T m = R m /Z m . The first result is a consequence of Theorem 4 in [3] .
Theorem 2
The following statements on the lower game are equivalent.
(iii) The additive eigenvalue problem
has the property that sup{λ | there is a viscosity subsolution of (2.2)} = inf{λ | there is a viscosity supersolution of (2.2)}. (2.3)
If one of the above assertions is true, then the constants in (i) and (ii) are equal and they coincide with the number defined by (2.3). Moreover, the same result holds for the upper game, after replacing l − val with u − val in (i) and (ii), and (2.2) with
PROOF It is well known [18, 10] that w(t, y) := t (l − val J(t, y)) is the viscosity solution of the Cauchy problem for the Isaacs equation
The equivalence of (iii) and the uniform convergence of w(t, ·)/t to a constant as t → ∞ is stated in Theorem 4 of [3] , and it gives the equivalence of (i) and (iii).
is the viscosity solution of the Isaacs equation
and Theorem 4 of [3] states the equivalence of (iii) and the uniform convergence of δw δ to a constant as δ → 0+. Therefore (ii) and (iii) are equivalent. The equality of the three constants is also given by Theorem 4 of [3] . Finally, the proof for the upper value is the same, with the Hamiltonian H = min max replaced by max min.
2 REMARK Note that (ii) deals with a vanishing discount rate problem for infinite horizon games. The equivalence between (i) and (ii) is a differential game extension of the classical AbelianTauberian theorem, stating that
whenever one of the two limits exists. The property (iii) is a characterization of the uniform ergodicity of the lower game by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. In some cases the inf and the sup in the formula (2.3) are attained and the number defined by (2.3) is the unique constant λ such that the additive eigenvalue problem (2.2) has a continuous viscosity solution, see the remark in Section 3. In general, however, even if (iii) holds, (2.2) may have no continuous solution χ (see Arisawa, Lions [8] ). By analogy with the theory of homogenization we call (2.2) the cell problem.
Whenever the conditions of Corollary 1 for the ergodicity of the LTAC game are satisfied, we have the following informations on the value of the game, namely, the constant λ.
Proposition 1 Assume (1.3) and that either the lower or the upper game is ergodic. Then
PROOF First we use the characterization (i) of ergodicity in Theorem 2, and we set w(t, y) :
It is well known [18, 10] that w satisfies, in the viscosity sense,
We observe that −t max y H(y, 0) and −t min y H(y, 0) are, respectively, a sub-and a supersolution of this Cauchy problem. Therefore the comparison principle gives
We divide by t and let t → +∞. Since w(t, y)/t → λ, and H(y, 0) = max a min b {−l(x, a, b)} by (1.3), we get the first pair of inequalities.
To prove the second statement we assume by contradiction that λ > −H(y, 0) in a neighborhood of a minimum point of −H(y, 0) = min a max b l(x, a, b). Now we use the characterization (ii) of ergodicity in Theorem 2, as in the proof of Theorem 3. With the same notations, the value
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in an open set. This is a contradiction with the assumption (2.4). 2 REMARK Note that, for a running cost independent of the controls, l = l(x), the condition (2.4) reads
in view of (1.3). This says that the first player has a stronger control on the vector field than the second. The conclusion is that the LTAC value is
so the minimizing player can drive asymptotically the system near the minimum points of the running cost.
Next we describe some sufficient conditions for the ergodicity of the upper or the lower game. We say that the system (1) is bounded-time controllable by the first player if for some S > 0 and for all x, x ∈ R m there is a strategy α ∈ Γ such that for all control functions b ∈ B
where y x (·) is the trajectory corresponding to the strategy α and the control function b, i.e., it solvesẏ
In other words, the first player can drive the system from any initial position x to any given state x on the torus T m in a uniformly bounded time for all possible behaviors of the second player. Symmetrically, we say that he system (1) is bounded-time controllable by the second player if for some S > 0 and for all x, x ∈ R m there is a strategy β ∈ ∆ such that for all control functions a ∈ A
where y x (·) is the trajectory corresponding to the strategy β and the control function a, i.e., it solvesẏ
For systems with a single player this notion is studied in the literature under various names such as complete controllability [15] , uniform exact controllability [7] , and total controllability [9] .
Theorem 3 If the system (1) is bounded-time controllable by the first player (respectively, by the second player), then the lower game (respectively, the upper game) is ergodic.
PROOF The proof uses the characterization (ii) of ergodicity in Theorem 2, and we call w δ the lower value function of the discounted infinite horizon problem, namely,
The main tool of the proof is the following Dynamic Programming Principle due to Soravia, Remark 4.2 of [32] ,
where y(·) is the trajectory of (2.8) with α replaced by a generic α.
For fixed x, x we take a strategy α ∈ Γ such that (2.7) holds. Then (2.9) and the periodicity of w δ give
where y(·) is the trajectory of (2.8). Since l and δw δ are uniformly bounded, there is a constant C such that
Now we exchange the roles of x and x to get
If for fixed x we choose a sequence δ k → 0 such that δ k w δ k ( x) → µ, we obtain the uniform convergence of δ k w δ k to µ. We claim that µ is independent of the sequence δ k . This implies the uniform convergence of the whole net δw δ to µ, as desired. To prove the claim we recall the cell problem (2.2), i.e.,
where λ is a constant, and use the inequality λ 1 := sup{λ | ∃ a u.s.c. subsolution of (2.11)} ≤ λ 2 := inf{λ | ∃ a l.s.c. supersolution of (2.11)}, which follows from a standard argument based on the comparison principle for sub-and supersolutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (see, e.g., the proof of Theorem 1 in [7] or that of Theorem 4 in [3] ). The Isaacs equation satisfied by w δ in viscosity sense is (see, e.g., [10] )
Then, for λ < µ, w δ k is a subsolution of (2.11) for k large enough, so µ ≤ λ 1 . The same argument gives λ 2 ≤ µ. Therefore µ = λ 1 = λ 2 , which proves the claim. 2
An immediate consequence of this theorem and of Corollary 1 is the following.
Corollary 2 Assume the Isaacs' condition (1.3) and that the system (1) is bounded-time controllable either by the first or by the second player. Then the LTAC game is ergodic, i.e., l − val
J ∞ (x) = u − val J ∞ (x) = lim T →∞ val J(T, x) = λ, ∀x ∈ R m .
PoS(CSTNA2005)025
Some ergodic problems for differential games Martino Bardi We end this section with some sufficient conditions for ergodicity that are symmetric for the two players, different from the preceding Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 where one of the two players have a much stronger hold of the system than the other. We take a system of the form       ẏ
and we assume that the state variables y A are (uniformly) asymptotically controllable by the first player, whereas the variables y B are asymptotically controllable by the second, in the following sense. There exists a function η : 14) and for all x A , x A ∈ R m A , x B ∈ R m B , there is a strategy α ∈ Γ such that, for x = (x A , x B ),
whereas for all x B , x B ∈ R m B , x A ∈ R m A , there is a strategy β ∈ ∆ such that 1 T We will also assume that the running cost does not depend on the controls, l = l(y A , y B ), and it has a saddle point in 
REMARK If the system governing y A is bounded-time controllable by the first player and also stoppable, i.e., ∀x ∈ R m , ∀b ∈ B, ∃a ∈ A : f A (x, a, b) = 0, then the variables y A are asymptotically controllable, because x A can be reached from x A in a time smaller than S and then the first player can keep y A (t) = x A for all later times t. In this case, if l = l( x A , x B ), an optimal strategy for the first player amounts to driving the variables y A to the saddle point x A and stopping there, and the strategy of going to x B and staying there forever is optimal for the second player. This kind of behavior is called a turnpike, see [14, 13] .
Examples
Example 1: first order controllability. Assume that for some ν > 0 ) it is known that the system is (small-time) controllable by the first player and the time necessary to reach a point x from x satisfies an estimate of the form
Therefore the lower game is uniformly ergodic in this case. Moreover, if l = l(x) it is easy to see that (2.6) holds, so λ = min x l(x).
Example 2: higher order controllability. Consider a system of the forṁ By choosing a k ≡ 0 we obtain a symmetric system independent of the second player. Then the classical Chow's theorem of geometric control theory says that this system is small-time locally controllable at all points of the state space. Moreover, for any small t > 0 the reachable set from x in time t is a neighborhood of x, and the same holds for the reachable set backward in time. From this, using the compactness of the torus T m , it is easy to see that the whole state space is an invariant control set in the terminology of [15] . Then the global bounded-time controllability follows from Lemma 3.2.21 in [15] . In conclusion, the full system (3.2) is bounded-time controllable by the first player and therefore the lower game is uniformly ergodic. As in the previous example, if λ is independent of the controls (2.6) holds and λ = min x l(x).
REMARK If (2.7) holds with t # (x, x, α, b) ≤ ω(|x − x|) for all |x − x| ≤ γ and all b ∈ B, for some modulus ω and γ > 0, we say that (1) is also small-time controllable by the first player. For such systems there exists a continuous solution χ to the additive eigenvalue problem (2.2), by Proposition 9.2 in [4] . The systems of the Examples 1 and 2 are indeed small-time controllable by the first player.
Example 3: separate controllability. For a system of the form (2.13) we can assume that the subsystem for the variables y A either satisfies
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or it is of the formẏ 
Ergodicity of noisy systems
In this section we study the ergodicity of the lower value for the following class of stochastic differential games. We consider the controlled diffusion process
where W is an r-dimensonal Brownian motion, and σ is a continuous map from R m × A × B to the space of m × r matrices, lipschitzean in x uniformly in a, b. The finite horizon cost functional is
where E denotes the expectation. The set of admissible controls for the second player, that we still denote with B, contains the progressively measurable functions of time taking values in B, and A will denote the admissible controls of the first player. We also keep the notation Γ and ∆ for the set of nonanticipating admissible strategies for the first player and the second player, respectively, and we refer to [20] for the precise definitions in the stochastic setting. The lower value of the finite horizon game is
and we say that the lower game is ergodic if
Besides the periodicity in the state variable of f and l (2.1) we assume
We are going to extend all the results of Section 2 to this setting, and we also present a theorem where the ergodicity is due to the effects of the diffusion without any controllability hypothesis. Analogous results hold for the upper game, which is defined in the obvious way, but we will not state them explicitly. We begin with the stochastic counterpart of the Abelian-Tauberian-type Theorem 2, that is again a consequence of Theorem 4 in [3] . We will use the second order Hamiltonian
for y, p ∈ R m and X any symmetric m × m matrix.
Theorem 4
The following statements are equivalent.
(i) The lower game is ergodic, i.e., v(T, x) → const uniformly in x as T → +∞.
(iii) The cell problem
has the property that sup{λ | there is a viscosity subsolution of (4.2)} = inf{λ | there is a viscosity supersolution of (4.2)}. and
see [20] . If, moreover, 
2
It is well known that nondegenerate diffusion processes are ergodic (in the standard sense). The next result states the ergodicity of games involving a controlled system affected by a nondegenerate diffusion, with no controllability assumptions. It is a consequence of Theorem 7.1 in our paper [4] , see also [3] . Earlier related results are due to Evans [16] and Arisawa and Lions [8] .
Theorem 5 Assume that, for some ν > 0, the minimal eigenvalue of the matrix σσ T (y, a, b) is larger than ν, for all y ∈ R m , a ∈ A, b ∈ B. Then the lower game is ergodic.
PROOF By means of regularity estimates for viscosity solutions of fully nonlinear uniformly elliptic PDEs, Theorem 7.1 in [4] shows that there exists a (unique) constant λ such that the cell problem (4.2) has a continuous viscosity solution χ. Then u(t, y) := λt + χ(y) solves
Since w(t, y) := tv(t, y) solves (4.4), by the comparison principle for viscosity solutions of Cauchy problems we get u(t, y) − max χ ≤ tv(t, y) ≤ u(t, y) + min χ ∀t, y.
The next result is an extension to stochastic games of Theorem 3. We say that the system (4.1) is bounded-time controllable by the first player if for some S > 0 and for all x, x ∈ R m there is a strategy α ∈ Γ such that for all admissible control functions b ∈ B
where y x (·) is the solution of (4.1) corresponding to the controls α[b] and b.
Theorem 6 If the system (4.1) is bounded-time controllable by the first player, then the lower game is ergodic.
PROOF We follow the argument of the proof of Theorem 3. We use the characterization (ii) of ergodicity in Theorem 4, and we call w δ the lower value function of the discounted infinite horizon problem, namely,
The main tool of the proof is the following Dynamic Programming Principle for stochastic games due to Swiech, Corollary 2.6 (iii) of [36] ,
For fixed x, x we take a strategy α ∈ Γ such that (4.7) holds. Then (4.8) and the periodicity of w δ give
where y x (·) is the trajectory of (4.1) with the controls α[b] and b. Now the proof of Theorem 3 shows that, along a sequence δ k → 0, δ k w δ k → µ uniformly. Finally, the proof that µ dos not depend on the sequence δ k is also the same as in Theorem 3, with the new cell problem (4.2) and using the equation (4.5) satisfied by w δ .
2
The last result of the section is a stochastic counterpart of Proposition 2. We take a controlled diffusion of the form As in Section 2 we assume that the running cost does not depend on the controls and has a saddle point. The Isaacs condition now is REMARK If the system governing y A is bounded-time controllable by the first player and also stoppable, i.e., ∀x ∈ R m , ∀b ∈ B, ∃a ∈ A : f A (x, a, b) = 0, σ A (x, a, b) = 0, then the variables y A are asymptotically controllable, because x A can be reached from x A in a time smaller than S and then the first player can keep y A (t) = x A for all later times t. As in the deterministic case, an optimal strategy for each player is a turnpike: driving the system to a saddle point and stopping there.
REMARK
The proof of Proposition 4 shows also that the upper game is ergodic and the upper value u − val J(T, x) converge uniformly to the saddle l as T → ∞.
